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CONFLICT OF LAWS
THE SIGNIFICANCE IN CONFLICT OF LAWS OF THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERSTATE AND
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
By ARMAND B. Du Bois*
T IS NOT without significance that "conflict of laws" rather than
"private international law" is the term commonly used in the
United States in denominating that branch of the law which "de-
termines whether the law of one or of another state shall be
applied to a legal situation."' In a federal state like the United
States, by far the greater number of cases dealing with conflict
of laws relate to situations where the contacts are divided among
states of the union. It is the exceptional case that involves a
country foreign to the United States. Moreover, if the history
of conflict of laws be reviewed, it will be found that interstate or
interprovincial conflicts as distinguished from conflicts between
the laws of distinct national states have been of great importance
in the development of the body of theory that has grown up
around the subject. Problems arising from the existence of a
multitude of Italian city states, with diverse laws, but all theo-
retically subject to the Holy Roman Empire, gave rise to the con-
tribution of Bartolus (1314-1357)2 who foreshadowed much of
modern.conflict theory. Conflicts between the coutumes of the
provinces of the feudal kingdom of France inspired the specula-
tions of D'Argentre (1519-1520) and Dumoulin (1500-1566-7).'
*New York, N. Y. William Bayard Cutting Fellow in Columbia
University, 1932-1933.
1(1930) Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, No. 1, The Ameri-
can Law Institute.2Bartolus, Beale's Translation. Beale comments in his Treatise on the
Conflict of Laws, page 24:
"The tribal law gradually became assimilated with the law of the land.
or rather, in many parts of the empire, more or less completely absorbed
the Roman law, though in theory every part of the empire was during the
early Middle Ages governed by imperial law, however much the imperial
law of one portion of the empire might differ from that of another portion.
But, throughout the empire, and especially in Italy, city-states developed
and each of these had its own local ordinances, or statuta." Bartolus drew
his illustrations primarily from the cities of Italy, although he did refer to
England in his hypothetical cases without apparent distinction in treatment.3Beale says in his Treatise, page 30, "France was a confederation of
provinces, each with its own law which was called custom, and the customs
of northern France retained small traces of the Roman law."
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The work of the Dutch school, Huber, John Voet, was motivated
by conflicts between "the laws of the confederated Dutch prov-
inces practically autonomous states jealous of each other's inde-
pendence and power."'4 Huber exercised a great influence on
Story who himself wrote with the American scene of interstate
conflicts in mind. Thus a conflict tleory which still influences to
a large extent American conflict law had been formulated long
before the appearance of nationalism or the national state as
integral elements of western civilization.5
Moreover, it has only been for the past hundred years that
communication and transportation facilities have made possible
frequent international transactions. With the crystallization of
the theory of nationalism, and with the increased importance of
international transactions, it might have been expected that there
would be some attempt to distinguish international from interstate
conflicts. Strangely enough, the factor of a national boundary
has not, in most cases, been deemed significant. Conflict learning,
built up in a world of interstate transactions, was applied without
hesitation to the international situation.
In the Anglo-American literature of conflicts discussion of a
possible distinction is practically non-existent. Story does not
consider the point." Neither Minor T Wharton,8 Goodrich,9 nor
4Beale, Conflict of Laws, in 4 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 188;
On the Dutch School, see also Lorenzen, E., Huber's De Conflictu Legum,(1918) 13 Ill. L. Rev. 375; Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 18-
61. Beale comments on page 38 of the latter work: "The scene of legal
development in this subject shifted in the 17th Century to the Netherlands,
where the creation of a confederated nation composed of legally independent
provinces had the natural effect of stimulating interest in the conflict of
laws; just as it had in France a century earlier, and in the United States
two centuries later. A society inhabiting a number of federated provinces,
each with its own law but united politically and socially into a single people,
with constant intercommunication, requires a definitely fixed and workable
body of principles for the solution of conflicts of law."5For a keen analysis of the comparatively recent appearance of nation-
alism in Western Civilization, see Hayes, Essays on Nationalism.
"Story, Conflict of Laws, 1st ed., sec. 6, writes: "Questions of this sort
must be of frequent occurrence not only in different countries wholly inde-
pendent of each other but also in provinces of the same empire, governed
by different laws as in the case of France before the revolution."
Then he goes on in sec. 7 with the generalization:
"It is plain that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force
proprio vigore except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the
country."
In sec. 9 he says:
"The jurisprudence thus arising from the conflict of the laws of mod-
em nations in their actual application to modern commerce and intercourse
is a most interesting and important branch of public law. To no part of the
world is it of more interest and importance than to the United States since
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the Re-statement 0 draw a differentiation between the two sorts of
conflicts. The matter is concisely put by Beale, who says in his,
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws,1 '
"We have, it is true, the usual number of questions arising
out of conflicts with foreign laws, but we have in addition a much
larger body of litigation concerning conflicts of law within the
nation. No American lawyer has suggested any important dis-
tinction between conflicts of national law and conflicts of local
law."
Statements are readily found in American judicial opinions that
the states of the Union are to be considered as foreign to one
another. For example in the Minnesota Case of Rentund v. Coin-
nzerciat Mining Company,'2 the question was whether a non-resi-
dent alien could take advantage of the Minnesota Lord Camp-
bell's Act, in connection with an accident occurring in Minnesota.
Lewis, J. commented:
"In the first place, it must be admitted that there can be no
valid distinction in the relations which exist between the several
states of the United States and between a state and a foreign
nation. There are no constitutional restrictions which limit the
application of the statute in favor of the residents of other states
and against non-resident aliens. But the argument is made that
the union of a national government with that of twenty-four distinct and in
some respects independent states necessarily creates very complicated rela-
tions and rights between the citizens of those states which call for the con-
stant administration of extra municipal principles." His hypothetical cases
are derived from both international and interstate transactions.
7Minor, Conflicts of Law 3 says: "The states of this Union are sov-
ereign states, save in so far as they have by solemn compact yielded their
sovereignty to the federal government."
8Wharton, A Treatise on the Conflicts of Law.
9Goodrich, Handbook on the Conflict of Laws 457: "For many, perhaps
most purposes in the conflicts of laws the states of the 'United States are
treated as foreign to each other. The law of another state is foreign law, a
corporation organized under the laws of another state is a foreign corpora-
tion. A claim in tort arising under the law of another state is as much a
claim for a foreign tort as if it arose in England. A judgment of a court
of another state is a foreign judgment in the sense that proceedings to
collect the sum due may not be directly instituted upon the judgments."
l0The Restatement definition of "state" which is the basis of the Re-
statement's analysis includes both a state of the United States and a foreign
country. Section 2.
Compare Dicey, International Private Law, 2d ed., p. xl, definition of a
foreign country as "Any country which is not England."
-Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 142. Note also the dictum of
the Civil Court of Avesnes (France) (1922) quoted in Eliesco, Essai sur
les Conflits de Lois dans l'6space sans Conflits de souvertainet6 67, "Pour
les pays ofi s'ilavent des conflits interprovinciaux il est de r gle universelle
que ces conflits doivent Etre rdsolus d'apr~s les memes principes que les con-
flits internationaux."
12(1903) 89 Minn. 41, 46, 93 N. W. 1057, 1059.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
on account of the close relations of the states and their connection
with the general government such discrimination was intended and
should be made. Such a distinction does not seem to me to be
founded upon any sound principles. There is no more reason for
extending the application of the statute to a resident of another
state than there is for extending it to the benefit of foreign sub-
jects.' 3
On the other hand, judicial utterances can be discovered that
indicate that the commercial and political ties that bind together
the states of the Union should be given weight in conflicts prob-
lems. This argument was most eloquently put by Judge Thompson
of the Saint Louis court of appeals in 1885. The case 14 involved
the question whether an assignment for the equal benefit of cred-
itors made in Illinois by an Illinois resident would be recog-
nized in Missouri in so far as the assignment attempted to transfer
claims in an action pending in Missouri. Illinois would not have
recognized a similar Missouri assignment. In disposing of the
argument that recognition of the Illinois transfer should depend
on the reciprocal recognition by Illinois of a Missouri transfer,
the judge said:
"We have outgrown that juridical conception of the
nature of the federal union which places the states of the Union
in respect of the effect to be given to the laws of one state within
the limits of another state in the relation of foreign countries such
as the states of Europe bear to edch other. These states are mem-
bers of one national union. Their forms of government are, and
must be under the federal constitution republican and hence sim-
ilar to each other. Their people are homogeneous. They are
bound together by the closest and most constant commercial inter-
course. Their laws both common and statute are homogeneous in
their character; so much so that the decisions of the courts of one
state upon questions of the common and statute law or of equity
are constantly cited as evidence of the law in the courts of other
states whilst in the absence of proof of the law of other states,
13The language of Lewis, J. was quoted with approval by Stone, J.,
dissenting in Bonright v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. R., (1930)
180 Minn. 52, 230 N. W. 457.
See also the statement of Carter, J. in Dougherty v. American McKenna
Process Company, (1912) 255 Ill. 369, 371, 99 N. E. 619, 621; also the
statement of Washington, J. in Buckner v. Farley, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.)
586, 590, 7 L. Ed. 528. The case involved the question whether a bill drawn
in Maryland on a New Orleans resident was a foreign bill of exchange
within the meaning of the judiciary act. He said: "For all national pur-
poses embraced by the federal constitution the states and the citizens thereof
are one united under the same sovereign authority and governed by the
same laws. In all other respects the states are necessarily foreign to and
independent of each other."
14Zuppmann v. Bauer, (1885) 17 Mo. App. 678, 682.
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the presumption obtains that it is the same as the law of the forum.
Such being our situation and relations inter esse the doctrine which
assigns to the statutes of a sister state of the union no greater
credit or comity than would be assigned to the laws of a foreign
state seems to be narrow, barbarous, and tribal.""
In a search for possible indications of significant differences
between international and interstate transactions in conflict of
laws, the realm of that "unruly horse" public policy seemed an
auspicious place to start. In the application of the doctrine, now
firmly rooted in American conflict theory, that a state will not
enforce a law of a foreign state which is contrary to its public
policy, there is some indication that the prevalence of interstate
conflicts has been of influence.
In 1918, Judge Beach of Connecticut in an article entitled,
Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights1" called into
15A similar attitude to that of Judge Thompson was expressed in Carey
v. Schmettz, (1909) 221 Mo. 132, 138, 119 S. W. 946, 947 where the Missouri
court refused to enforce as penal an action arising out of the failure of a
corporation to file reports as required by Colorado law. Valliant, J. referred
to "the more intimate international law between the sister states of the
Union." But, he concluded, "considering the large number of states of this
Union, and their separate and distinct governmental policies, great confusion
would result if rights of action created by the peculiar policy of one state
could be carried into another state or the state to which it is carried be
compelled to enforce it through its courts although contrary to its policy
of its own laws."
In Schroeder Wine and Liquor Co. v. Willis Coal and Mining Com-
pany, (1913) 179 Mo. App. 93, 161 S. W. 352, a case involving an Illinois
statutory exemption of wages from garnishment Thompson, J.'s statement
was approved. However, the decision turned on the point that the Illinois
and Missouri exemption laws were alike in policy and differed only with
respect to the amount of the exemption.
In Wabash R. R. v. Hassett, (1908) 170 Ind. 370, 379, 83 N. E. 705,
709, an action was sought to be brought on an Illinois wrongful death stat-
ute for an injury occurring in Illinois. Illinois would not have allowed an
action in its courts on an Indiana injury. In disposing of the reciprocity
argument, Montgomery, J. said: "The doctrine of reciprocity is a fair and
reasonable principle to govern the conduct of independent nations in afford-
ing relief to aliens through their courts. The people of the United States
comprise one nation banded together among other reasons to establish justice
and to promote the general welfare. Each state may undoubtedly limit the
jurisdiction of its court and formulate its local policy, but in the absence of
a state policy declared and restricted by statute, the rule contended for is
too narrow and illiberal to meet our approval."
16(1918) 27 Yale L. J. 656, 657, 662. Compare the statement of the
German Waechter (quoted in Bar, International Law 92).
"Rights and relations which were established in one district of a state
in conformity with its particular law must be judged of according to that
particular law all over the entire state. If they are properly founded or
acquired according to the law of the district, they must be recognized and
protected all over the state in the same way. For it is the duty of the state
to recognize and protect every legal relation in the way in which it has been
established by the act of a particular law established by a state."
See also Pillet's remark in his Principes du Droit Int. Priv6i 46.
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question, in the light of the full faith and credit clause, the pro-
priety of a state refusing to give effect to the law of a sister state
because of a supposed incompatibility with its policy. He wrote:
"I believe that the uniform interstate enforcement of vested
rights is bound to come not only as a matter of justice but as a
legal corollary of the national unity of the several states. . . . It
would be an intolerable affectation of superior virtue for the
Courts of one state to pretend that the mere enforcement of a
right validly created by the laws of a sister state would be repug-
nant to good morals, would lead to disturbance and disorganiza-
tion of the local municipal law or would be of such evil example
as to corrupt the jury or the public."
This idea found expression in the leading case of Loucks v.
Standard Oil Company of New York,17 in which Justice Cardozo,
in allowing an action in New York on a Massachusetts wrongful
death statute, said:
"The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights
lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained. At least that is
so among the states of the Union.... There is a growing convic-
tion that only exceptional circumstances should lead one of the
states to refuse to enforce a right acquired in another."
In the course of his opinion, Justice Cardozo cited certain
Massachusetts decisions as indicating the change of attitude of the
Massachusetts courts toward wrongful death statutes. The ear-
lier Massachusetts rule did not permit recovery on a wrongful
death statute of another jurisdiction.' Nevertheless, in 1909 when
it was sought to recover in Massachusetts on a New York Lord
Campbell's Act, the action was allowed, with the court saying,
"The tendencies of later decisions have also been towards a broader
comity in the enforcement of rights created by legislation of sister
states."'19 However, when the question later arose as to whether
"Entre communaut~s comprises dans un m~me corps politique it serait
inintelligible qu'un acte r~gulirement accompli dans un lieu quelconque
n'eCit pas son effet assur6 sur tout le territoire de la f~dration."
"7(1918) 224 N. Y. 99, 113, 120 N. E. 198.
'SRichardson v. New York Central R. R., (1867) 98 Mass. 85.
19Walsh v. Boston and Maine Railroad, (1909) 201 Mass. 527, 88 N.
E. 12. Earlier expressions of the idea of interstate cooperation are to be
found in Walsh v. New York and New England R. R. Co., (1894) 160
Mass. 571, 572, 36 N. E. 584, in which an action was brought in Massachu-
setts to recover for injuries suffered in Connecticut. According to the
Massachusetts rule, the particular injury would have been considered as
caused by the negligence of the plaintiff's fellow servants. By Connecticut
law, the injury would be considered as due to the negligence of the defend-
ant. In allowing the Connecticut rule to be applied, Holmes, J. said:
"But, however this may be, we are of opinion that as between the states
of the union when a transitory cause of action has vested in one under the
common law as there understood and administered, the mere existence of a
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an action would lie on the English Lord Campbell's Act, the ear-
lier cases were not distinguished on the ground that here a foreign
country was involved, and recovery was allowed.2 0  Thus in
Massachusetts a departure from the English tort rule2 was influ-
enced in some measure by a consideration of the relations between
the American states. Yet, the modified rule thus developed was
not applied exclusively to interstate situations but was extended to
international transactions.
In dealing with the public policy concept, other courts besides
those of New York and Massachusetts have paid at least lip serv-
ice to the ideal of interstate cooperation.2 2 Moreover, the Loucks
Case has had some influence in at least two jurisdictions, namely,
Minnesota 2 3 and Vermont.2 4 But, on the other hand, numerous
slight variance of view in the forum resorted to not amounting to a funda-
mental difference of policy should not prevent an enforcement of the obli-
gation admitted to have arisen by the law which governed the conduct of
the parties."
In 1900, a resident of Ireland sued under the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute for an injury occurring in Massachusetts. The statute was
construed to permit her to recover. Holmes, J. commented, Mulhall v.
Fallon, (1900) 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386, 388,
"Our different relations to our neighbors politically and territorially is
a sufficient ground for a more liberal rule, at least as to inhabitants of the
United States. Whether if the statute were of a different kind, we could
make a distinction between a mother living just across the boundary line
between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and one living in Ireland need
not be considered now."20Hansen v. Leyland Co., (1916) 223 Mass. 438, 111 N. E. 907.
21In Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) 6 Q. B. 1, 10 B. & S. 1004, 40 L. J. Q. B.
28, 22 L. T. 869, it was decided that when an action is brought in England
on a tort committed in a foreign country, "The wrong must be of such a
character that it would have been actionable if committed in England."22 1n Bond v. Hume, (1917) 243 U. S. 15, 22, 37 Sup. Ct. 366, 61 L Ed.
565, the question was whether the federal court sitting in Texas would
enforce a contract made in Texas relating to futures on the New York
Stock Exchange. Justice White said: "Courts of one sovereignty will not
refuse to give effect to the principle of comity by declining to enforce con-
tracts which are valid under the laws of another sovereignty unless con-
strained to do so by clear convictions of the existence of the conditions (pub-
lic policy] justifying that course. ... It is certain that these principles
which govern as to countries foreign to each other apply with greater force
to the relations of the several states to each other, since the obligations of the
constitution which bind them all in a common orbit of national unity impose
of necessity restrictions which otherwise would not obtain and exact a
greater degree of respect for each other than otherwise by the principles of
comity would be expected." See also the statement of Taney, J. in Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, (1839) 13 Pet. (U.S.) 519, 584, 10 L Ed. 274. "The
intimate union of these states as members of the same great political
family, the deep and vital interests which bind them so closely together
should lead us in the absence of proof to the contrary to presume a greater
degree of comity and friendship and kindness towards one another than
we should be authorized to presume between foreign nations."23The Loucks Case was cited in Chibbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182
Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314, 316, in which an action was brought on a Wis-
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American courts have not been hesitant to apply the public policy
doctrine to the laws of sister states. 5  The Arizona20 and Wyom-
ing2 courts, for example, have analyzed the problems of chattels
mortgaged in other states in terms of comity and reciprocity.
However, most American courts in applying to the laws of
foreign countries the concept of public policy do not seem to
impose a standard in any degree more rigid than that applied to the
laws of sister states. The problem was interestingly raised in the
Arizona case of Veytia v. Alvarez.26  The question was whether
consin Lord Campbell's Act. Wilson, C. J. said: "Under the Wisconsin
statute, plaintiff has a vested right and the uniform interstate enforcement
of vested rights is desirable." However, earlier Minnesota cases adopting
a similar liberal attitude towards the wrongful death statutes of sister
states did not distinguish interstate from international problems. See Her-
rick v. R. R. Co., (1883) 31 Minn. 11, 16 N. W. 413; Powell v. Great
Northern R. R. Co., (1907) 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W. 1017.24 The Vermont court in Wellman v. Mead, (1919) 93 Vt. 322, 326, 332,
107 Atl. 396, 398, 401, in deciding that a Massachusetts wrongful death
statute was not a penal law nor against Vermont public policy, said: "The
evident tendency of modern decisions is towards a broader comity in the
enforcement of rights created by the legislation of sister states. . . .As
said in Loucks v. Standard Oil Company, the fundamental public policy at
least among the states of the union is that rights lawfully vested shall be
everywhere maintained. The decisions manifest a growing conviction that
only exceptional circumstances should lead one of the states to refuse to
enforce a right acquired in another."
25Flagg v. Baldwin, (1884) 38 N. J. Eq. 219 (New York gambling
contract); Pope v. Hanke, (1899) 155 II1. 617, 40 N. E. 839 (gambling
contract); 'Union Trust Co. v. Grossman, (1918) 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup.
Ct. 147, 62 L. Ed. 368 (contract made by married woman) ; Armstrong v.
Best, (1893) 112 N. C. 59, 17 S. E. 14 (married woman's contract) ; Fox
v. Postal Tel. Co., (1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399 (limitation of lia-
bility).26Forgan v. Bainbridge, (1928) 34 Ariz. 408, 414, 274 Pac. 155, 158,
Lockwood, J. says "And so far as the rule of comity is concerned, except
as otherwise qualified by the federal constitution, the states of the Union
are considered as foreign nations, and separate sovereignties."27Union Securities Co. v. Adams, (1925) 33 Wyo. 45, 49, 57, 236 Pac.
513, 514, 517. Wyoming refused to protect the mortgagee of a chattel
mortgaged in Texas since Texas would not protect a Wyoming mortgagee.
Blume, J. said:
"It is fundamental that the laws of Texas have ipso proprio vigore no
extraterritorial force. So far as their effect is concerned every other state
must be regarded as separate sovereignty to the same extent as though it
were a foreign nation." He continues, "Living in a union of forty-eight
states, obedient to the same flag, speaking the same language, having largely
the same customs, and following the same pursuits, it should be the policy
of every state to extend rather than to limit the doctrine of comity. But,
we must necessarily pause and hesitate to apply it in a case like that at bar
when we can find no possible justification for it and when the decision nec-
essarily resulting in an injury to a citizen of this state would find no basis
in any sound principle of law."
It seems that it might be difficult to find circumstances under which
Blume, 3. would see fit to extend the doctrine of comity.
2S(1926) 30 Ariz. 316, 323, 329, 247 Pac. 117, 120, 121.
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Arizona would enforce an action against an Arizona resident for
the purchase of liquor in Mexico. The defendant's counsel ar-
gued "public policy," and attempted to distinguish some of his
opponent's cases "on the ground that the motives of comity among
the states are stronger and more compelling than those among the
nations." Jones, J. said:
"But in the cases cited above [The Lot-ks Case was among
them!] no point or mention is made thereof. ... It may well be
that the ties of comity among the states are or ought to be stronger
than those between nations... but none will argue that we should
indulge in a spirit of captiousness against our neighboring repub-
lic. With it and its people, our government and our people are in
constant governmental and commercial contact. . . . Citizens of
the one country own property and transact business in the other
and the course of trade is growing. It should be encouraged and
fostered for our mutual welfare. Adverse decisions on the
ground of policy will breed suspicion of discrimination against us.
Elusive notions of public policy, an unruly horse at best, should
not be an obstacle to just claims."
Next to be considered is the domicile concept, prominent in the
Anglo-American law of conflicts. One obvious result of the im-
portance of interstate conflicts in the United States has been to
make inconvenient in the great majority of American conflicts
cases the use of the nationality device, popular on the continent. -
As between the states of a federated nation, the nationality of a
person has little significance. But even in regard to international
conflicts, no use has been made by American courts of the na-
tionality test. Certain European federated states such as Switzer-
land, Poland and Jugo-Slavia have likewise recognized the ex-
pediency of using the domicile concept in interstate conflicts.
However, they have tended to continue to apply in appropriate
circumstances the national law of a citizen of a foregn country
29See Beale's discussion in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 71-74;
Wharton, Treatise on the Conflict of Law, sec. 32. Note Bar's statement in
his Private International Law 205, "Domicile too may in cases in which
different legal systems are recognized within the territory of the same state
be taken as the convenient rule for determining which of these systems is
applicable. That will be so when the population enjoys complete freedom
of movement and of settlement all over the territory, and laws of local
citizenship enjoy accordingly a comparatively trifling importance. The same
rule may indeed apply to the case of a confederation of states; if for
instance the legislation of the German Empire should hereafter adopt the
principle of nationality to regulate its relations with extra-German states
and legal systems, it might still be desirable to allow the principle of
domicile to determine the personal law of individual citizens of the empire
in the several federated states belonging to it rather than the principle of
birth or origin."
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rather than the laws of his last domicile. 0 The use of domicile
in England and the United States has been attended with a cer-
tain amount of confusion between it and the ideas associated with
allegiance and nationality. This was reflected in the English
judicial opinions by a stress on the domicile of origin,31 and by a
hesitancy to find a change of domicile from England to a foreign
country, especially to one in which there existed what the white
man was pleased to call an inferior civilization.32 The frequency
with which Americans travelled from state to state influenced the
American judges to depart from the English rule relating to the
revival of the domicile of origin. 33  Judge Faville of the Iowa
3
°For the Swiss situation under the law of 1891, see Lain6, Etude Con-
cernant la loi F6drale Suisse du 25 Juin 1891, in (1893-97) 23 Bulletin de
Societe Lgislation CompAre 128, 209. The conflicts problem was analyzed
in terms of (1) Swiss nationals residing in a different canton than that of
their origin, (2) Swiss residing in foreign countries, (3) citizens of foreign
countries residing in Switzerland. While the domicile concept was applied
to all three classes, under certain circumstances the national law was
applied to classes 2 and 3. The national law of a Swiss was to be found by
reference to the law of the canton of his birth. Later legislation has unified
the internal legal organization of Switzerland to a large extent.
The Polish Legislature on August 2, 1926, passed two distinct laws regu-
lating respectively (1) international conflicts and (2) conflicts among the
six provinces of Poland, Niboyet, Manuel de Droit International Priv6
15-21. While nationality was to be a basic factor in the field of interna-
tional conflicts, in the matter of competing provincial laws domicile was to
be applied. See Eliesco, Essai sur les Conflits de lois dans l'6space sans
Conflits de souvertainet6 101.
In the Juglo-Slavian statute of 1928 relating to conflicts problems of
bills and notes, it was decreed that "la capacit6 d'une personne de s'obliger
par lettre du change est determin6e par loi de son pays." Sec. 94. This
provision applied only to subjects of foreign countries. As to citizens of
Jugo-Slavia which is a federal state, "la capacit6 juridique sera jug&c
d'apr~s le domicil du debituer au moment ou il est oblig6 par lettere de
change." Peritch, "Les droits international et interprovincial dans les
nouvelles lois yougoslaves sur la lettre de change et sur le cheque du 29
November 1928, 1 Annuaire de l'Association Yougoslave du Droit Int. 177."
By the Spanish Code of 1893, in international conflicts the national law
of the individual was important in many matters. Corresponding problems
arising among the provinces of Spain were to be solved in terms of the law
of the place of birth of the individual. Laine, Etude Concernant la Loi
Federal Suisse du 25 Juin 1891, 23 Bulletin Societe de Lgislation Compare
179. 31Udny v. Udny, (1869) L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441.320n a domicile in the far east see In re Tootal's Trusts, (1883) 23 Ch.
D. 532, 52 L. J. Ch. 664, 48 L. T. 816, 31 W. R. 653; overruled by Casdagli
v. Casdagli, [1919] A. C. 145, 88 L. J. P. 49, 120 L. T. 52, 35 T. L. R. 30.
On the English attitude towards a change of domicile to a foreign coun-
try, see Lord v. Colvin, (1859) 4 Drew. 366, 422, 28 L. J. Ch. 361, 32 L. T.
0. S. 377, in which Kindersley, J. said: "The court would more readily
decide that a Scotchman had acquired a domicile in England than that he
had acquired a domicile in France;" Moorhouse v. Lord, (1863) 10 H. L.
Cas. 272, 273, 283, 32 L. J. Ch. 295, 1 New Rep. 555; Huntley, Marchioness
v. Gaskell, [1906] A. C. 56, 75 L. J. P. C. 1, 94 L. T. 33.33First National Bank of New Haven v. Balcom, (1868) 35 Conn. 351.
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court, after pointing out that the American conditions of travel
made the doctrine of reverter of the domicile of origin inappli-
cable to a change from state to state, did not hesitate to apply a
result reached by such reasoning to a change from an American
state to a foreign country.3 ' Here, again, a rule arising out of
interstate conditions is applied to an international situation. How-
ever, as far as the evidence necessary to show a change of domicile
is concerned, Vann, J. of the New York court of appeals has stated:
"Less evidence is required to establish a change of domicile
from one state to another than from one nation to another.
'3 5
This statement appears to reflect the New York viewpoint and
perhaps that of some other jurisdictions. 8
In the heart of conflicts, the choice of law problem, little can
be found in American judicial decisions to indicate a distinction
between interstate and international conflicts.3 T When a court has
358; Succession of Schuyler B. Steers, (1895) 47 La. Ann. 1551, 1554, 18
So. 503. In the latter case, the court said, "Here the customs, the habits
of the people, their ceaseless energies, their continuous change from locality
to locality, the sudden and dense population of new places, the desertion
and abandonment of old ones, all show that the people are migratory and
are not much influenced by birth, locality or the local history of families.
Hence we conclude that it will require the same facts only to show a
change of domicile from the domicile of birth that it would require to show
a change from one's selected domicile to another. The revival of the inten-
tion to return to the domicile of birth does not apply when the domicile of
origin and of selection are both domestic."
See Minor, Conflict of Laws, sec. 66.3 4 1n re Jones Estate, (1921) 192 Iowa 78, 182 N. W. 227.35Matter of Newcomb, (1908) 192 N. Y. 238, 250, 84 N. E. 950. The
case involved a possible change of domicile from New York to Louisiana.
Vann, J.'s statement was quoted with approval by McLaughlin, J. in United
States Trust Co. v. Hart, (1912) 150 App. Div. 413, 417, 135 N. Y. S. 81,
who in failing to find a French domicile concluded that the deceased "never
renounced his citizenship nor did he take any step to become a citizen of
France or to enjoy civil rights in that country by complying with section 13
of the Code Napoleon." See also Matter of Blumenthal, (1917) 101 Misc.
Rep. 83, 88, 167 N. Y. S. 252; in Cruger v. Phelps, (1897) 21 Misc. Rep.
252, 262, 47 N. Y. S. 61, in refusing to find that a domicile had been
changed to France, Chase, J. said, "In cases of succession, it requires plain
and certain evidence showing a fixed and definite purpose to establish that
a person had become a foreigner to his native land ;" see also Matter of
James, (1917) 221 N. Y. 242, 256, 116 N. E. 1010.
38See White v. Brown, (C.C. Pa. 1848) 1 Wall. Jr. 217, Fed. Cas. No.
17,538, where the court was slow to find a change of domicile to a foreign
country.37Any final decision in regard to the importance of the introduction of
an international element in a choice of law case will have to await a consid-
eration of practically every American choice of law case involving a contract
in a foreign country. While it seems clear from a limited perusal of the
digest that the introduction of the international contract will not give rise
to discussion in the opinion, it may well be that a careful analysis of the
results reached in these cases will reveal some unconscious reaction on the
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been faced with the problem of deciding whether the law of the
place where the last act necessary to make a contract was done or
whether the law of the place of performance should determine a
particular question relating to a contract, the fact that one contract
was in a foreign country while another was in a sister state has
had no apparent effect on the solution.38
The same conclusion must be reached in considering the atti-
tude of the courts in regard to giving effect to the expressed in-
tention of the parties in consensual transactions.8 9  Nor has the
judge's part to the crossing of a national boundary line. Fascinating vistas
of research in the history of a particular choice of law rule are opened up.
For example, take the rule that the law of the place where the last act
necessary to make a contract was done determines the capacity to make a
contract. Who first evolved the rule and in what connection? What are
the reasons for the rule? Are any of them tied up with the economic and
political conditions that arise from the relations of several confederated
states? Or are any of them connected with the economic barriers, the psy-
chological reactions, the philosophy of nationalism and national states has
built up? Was this rule first applied in American cases in an interstate or
an international transaction? From the point of view of results reached
rather than the language of the courts, has the introduction of a contract
of a foreign country been important?
It would require a similar consideration of every choice of law rule
before satisfactory conclusions could be drawn. The most that can be said
is that there is yet to be discovered in the American choice of law cases
any indication of a way in which the international element has been im-
portant. This is far from saying that upon complete investigation no such
indication will be found.38The spirit of Pendleton, J. seems to pervade the American decisions.
He said in Varder v. Arrel, (1796) 2 Wash. (Va.) 283, 298, "The laws
of a foreign country where the contract was made must govern. The same
principle applies though with no greater force to the different states of
America for though they form a confederated government, yet the several
states retain their individual sovereignties and with respect to their munic-
ipal regulation are to each other foreign." The case involved a debt con-
tracted in Pennsylvania which it was alleged had been paid by the offer of
Continental currency.
Note the indication in Milliken v. Pratt, (1878) 125 Mass. 374, that the
circumstance that Americans travel from state to state so extensively was
a factor influencing the court in applying the law of the place of contract-
ing to the question of capacity to contract. Of course, no distinction has
been drawn where the contracts were divided between one of the United
States and a foreign country.
Cf. O'Regan v. Cunard S. S. Co., (1894) 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E.
1070. in which Milliken v. Pratt was cited. A ticket agreement was made
in Massachusetts, but a new contract was later made in Ireland in regard
to a passage to Boston. Irish law was held to determine the validity of a
limitation of liability clause in the contract. See also Millenthal v. Mas-
cagni, (1903) 183 Mass. 19, 66 N. E. 424.39Where attention is paid to the intention of the parties in determining
the law that is to govern the validity of a contract, it is conceivable that an
American judge might more easily find an intention to be governed by the
law of a sister state than by the law of a foreign country. Compare the
language of Gray, J. in Liverpool and G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Insur-
ance Co., (1889) 129 U. S. 397, 461, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, 479, 32 L. Ed. 788, "In
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approach been different where the subject of judicial considera-
tion has been the various possible contacts presented in questions
involving real and personal property.'0
It is interesting to note that in Switzerland and Alsace Lor-
raine a distinction has been drawn between international and inter-
state conflicts in regard to the succession to immoveables. Thus if
the domicile contact and the location of the land contact are di-
vided between France and Alsace or Lorraine, the law of the
domicile governs the succession of both the immoveable and the
moveable property. But if the domicile be in a foreign country,
the law of the situs of the immoveables will govern as to them.41
this case, the contract was made in this country, between parties one resid-
ing and the other doing business here; and the law of England is a foreign
law which the American shipper is not presumed to know." Whether Gray,
J. was distinguishing the interstate situation is doubtful, and no suggestions
on the point have been found in other opinions.
Note in the French law of 1921 applicable to conflicts between French
and Alsace-Lorraine Law (article 10), provisions enabling those forming
contracts in Alsace to submit the contract to French law by a simple decla-
ration. Niboyet et Goule, Recueil de Textes Usuels de Droit Int. Similar
provision was made in the Spanish Code of 1889 in regard to interprovincial
conflicts. The individual could in many circumstances indicate a prefer-
ence that the common law of Spain govern. Eliesco, Essai sur les Conflits
de Lois dans l'6space sans Conflits de souvertainet6 99.40Note the statement of the Florida court in Wallace v. Wallace, (1895)
35 Fla. 49, 16 So. 783, "So far as the law of descent [to Florida land] is
concerned the lex locus rei sitae must prevail and the different states of
the union are foreign countries to each other." Consider the New Jersey
cases of Caruso v. Caruso, (N.J. 1930) 198 Atl. 882 and Harrall v. Har-
rall, (1884) 39 N. J. Eq. 279 where the New Jersey courts showed no
hesitation in applying to personal property located in New Jersey the dis-
tribution law of the domicile, a foreign country.
In National Cash Register Co. v. Lovett, (1906) 31 Nova Scotia 54
the question was whether compliance with a Nova Scotia registry act was
a condition precedent to the protection of the mortgagee's interest in a
chattel mortgage. In deciding the point, the court found it unnecessary to
determine whether the law of the place of contracting, Ohio (an interna-
tional contact), or the law of the place where the goods were received,
Ontario (an interprovincial contact) should govern the sale. Compare Bal-
lard v. Winter, (1894) 39 Conn. 177, 179, in which a chattel had been mort-
gaged in Massachusetts and removed to Connecticut. The court said: "It
would certainly be very inconvenient if such a mortgage fairly made in
Massachusetts should be held invalid in Connecticut in respect to moveable
property which may be daily passing to and fro along the dividing line
between the states."
In the workmen's compensation situation, no special consideration
seems to have been given to the international element. See for example
Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., (1930) 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622;
Saunder's Case, (1922) 126 Me. 144, 136 Atl. 722, in which the Maine
workmen's compensation law was applied to a workman working in New
Brunswick for a Maine corporation.
41On the Alsace-French situation see Audinet, La Solution des conflits
entre la loi francaise et la loi locale d'Alsace Lorraine en mati~re du droit
privi, (1921) 48 Clunet 801. The 1921 law expressly says, "Les rigles du
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This legislative solution suggests a possible modification of the
dominant influence the situs concept has acquired in this country
in regard to conflict problems relating to real property. Where
statutes have been passed in the American states that permit the
form of a deed or will conveying land within the state to be gov-
erned by the law of the place of execution,4 2 in a few instances
such a privilege has been limited to documents executed in an-
other state of the United States.
In considering a possible distinction between interstate and
international transactions in the United States, one must not dis-
regard constitutional limitations. The presence of the full faith
and credit clause of the federal constitution which is applicable
only to the "public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings" of
sister states 43 indicates a possible differentiation in constitutional
law between the interstate and the international situation. Such
has been the effect as far as the recognition of judgments is con-
cerned. The full faith and credit clause prevents a state from
ree-amininz a judgment of a sister state on the merits, and from
conflits etablies par la presente loi s'appliquerent exclusivement aux conflits
qui s'6lvent entre la loi francaise et la loi locale." For a text of the law see,
Niboyet et Goule, Recueil de Textes Usuels de Droit Int. See also
Niboyet, Manuel de Droit Int. Prive 19.
By the Swiss Code of 1891 if a Swiss died domiciled in a Swiss canton,
the law of that canton was to determine the succession to immoveables
situated anywhere in Switzerland. However, if a Swiss died domiciled in
a foreign country, the law of his canton of birth was to determine the suc-
cession to immoveables located in Switzerland. Lain6, Etude Concernant la
Loi F6drale Suisse du 25 Juin 1891, 23 Bulletin Societ6 de Legislation Com-
par6e 128, 175.
42See the states listed by Lorenzen in Validity of Wills, Deeds, Con-
tracts as regards form in the Conflict of Laws, (1911) 20 Yale L. J. 433.
Several of the states which drew the distinction at the time the article was
written have since removed the limitation, e.g., Rhode Island (wills),
New York (formerly wills executed in state of -United States, Canada or
Great Britain, and Ireland.) However, the following provision seems to
be still in effect in Arkansas, Digest of Statutes, Crawford and Moses,
sec. 10539, "Citizens of any of the United States or Territories thereof
owning real or personal property in this state may devise and bequeath the
same by last will and testament executed and proved according to the laws
of the state or territory in which the will may be made."
As to deeds, note section 509 of the Alaska Compiled Laws, 1913, If
any deed shall be executed in any state, territory or district of the United
States such deed may be executed according to the laws of such State, ter-
ritory, or district.43United States Constitution, art. IV, sec. 1. Cf. Huntington v. At-
trill, (1892) 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123, in which the
full faith and credit clause was interpreted in the light of the long estab-
lished conflict rule that "The courts of no country execute the penal laws
of another." Although Gray, J. in this case labelled this rule as a "maxim
of international law," it is to be noted that no distinction is drawn in the
application of this doctrine between interstate and international transactions.
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refusing to aid in its enforcement because the action on which it
was brought was contrary to the public policy of the second state."
While no such limitation restrains a state in considering a judg-
ment rendered by the courts of a foreign country," nevertheless
some jurisdictions in the United States such as New York do not
take advantage of their constitutional privilege of treating the
judgment of a court of a foreign country in a way different from
the judgment of a court of a sister state.' 6
However, when a choice of law problem is posited which in-
volves the applicability of the statutes or common law of another
jurisdiction, the exact scope of the full faith and credit clause has
been left undefined'4  and the due process clause, applicable to
both interstate and international transactions, has been utilized by
the Supreme Court as the restraining device. This is not the
place to deal with the fascinating problem elsewhere fully dis-
cussed'4 of the extent conflict of laws has become a branch of
constitutional law. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note
that there has been as yet no discussion in the Supreme Court
cases of the distinction between interstate and international trans-
actions, nor is there any clear indication that as to choice of law
the full faith and credit clause imposes a check on the states in
any way more rigid than that of due process.'
4
*Hanley v. Donoghue, (1885) 116 ,U. S. 1, 4, 6 Sup. CL 242, 244, 29
L. Ed. 535; Faunteroy v. Lum, (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641. 52
L. Ed. 1039; Goodrich, Handbook on the Conflict of Laws 451-477.
45Consider the reciprocity doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot, (1895) 159
U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95; McFadden, Reciprocity as a Con-
dition in the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments; Banco Minero v. Ross,
(1915) 106 Tex. 523, 172 S. W. 711 (Texas refused to recognize a Mexican
judgment on the ground that the Mexican procedure did not give a full and
a fair trial). Goodrich points out distinctions in the treatment of judg"
ments of sister states from judgments of foreign countries in the matter of
(1) fraud, (2) public policy, (3) merger of previous cause of action. On
merger, see Eastern Township Bank v. Beebe, (1880) 53 Vt 177.
46Johnston v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, (1926) 242 N. Y. 376,
152 N. E. 120; (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 892; Cowans v. Ticonderoga Power
Co., (1927) 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N. Y. S. 284.
47 Compare the attitude of Judge Beach in regard to the full faith and
credit clause, (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 656.
48Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts,(1929) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383; Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a
Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 MiNmasorm. LAw RLnmv, 161.
49See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review States Deci-
sions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533; note(1931) 40 Yale L. J. 291; consider New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge,
(1918) 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct 337, 62 L. Ed. 772; Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Liebing, (1922) 259 U. S. 209, 42 Sup. Ct. 467, 66 L. Ed. 900; Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, (1924) 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 129, 69
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In the matter of proof of foreign law, some attempt has been
made to differentiate between the laws of sister states and the
laws of foreign countries. Whether there will be applied a pre-
sumption that the foreign law is like that of the forum is decided
as a rule not in terms of sister state and foreign country but from
the standpoint of whether the basic legal system of the other
jurisdiction is a product of the common or civil law."' However,
rules in regard to the authentication of foreign law have been re-
laxed in regard to the laws of sister states, 1 and statutes have
been passed permitting the forum to take judicial notice of the
laws of sister states.52
In contrast to the Anglo-American literature of conflicts, some
discussion of the desirability of differentiating international and
interstate transactions is to be found on the continent. In Ger-
many, Savigny 53 and Bar,14 and in Italy, de Meilli" raised the
L. Ed. 342; Home Insurance Company v. Dick, (1930) 281 U. S. 397, 50
Sup. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926.
"
0See A. M. Kales, (1906) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 401; (1924) 22 Mich. L.
Rev. 734.
Cf. Owen v. Boyle, (1836) 15 Me. 147 where the Maine court refused
to presume that the English common law existed in New Brunswick.51See Emery v. Berry, (1854) 28 N. H. 473, 487; "While testimonial
evidence should be excluded .... we think we ought to hold that a printed
volume of the statutes of a sister state purporting upon its face to have been
printed by its authority and to contain the laws of the state should be ad-
mitted as prima facie evidence to show what these laws are. Such a course
seems called for by the great convenience and saving of expense to the
parties, and by the confidential relations which exist between the states;"
In Inhabitants of Raynam v. Inhabitants of Canton, (1825) 20 Mass. 293,
297, it was said: "In England it does not seem to be settled that printed
books of foreign law are to be received as evidence, and we do not mean
to say that the law of any country merely foreign may be so proved. But
the connection, intercourse, and constitutional ties which bind together the
several states require that this species of evidence shall be sufficient until
contradicted." For statutory regulation of the admission of copies of for-
eign statutes in evidence, see 3 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1684, note 15.
Several of the statutes apply the liberal rule only to the law of sister states
or United States territories, e. g., Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Rhode
Island, Vermont, Indiana.52See 5 Wigmore Evidence, sec. 2573. The Arkansas statute for exam-
ple provides, "The courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the laws
of other states," Digest of Statutes, Crawford and Moses, sec. 4110. Mani-
toba judicially notices the laws of any part of the United States, as well
as Canada.55Savigny, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, Guthrie Translation.
He says, page 27, "In this way we come to apply to the conflict of territorial
laws of independent states substantially the same principles which govern the
collision of particular laws in the same state."
"International Law, 1-12. Bar outlines the attitude taken by earlier
writers, considers the reasons advanced for drawing a distinction, points out
that no differentiation is observed in the Russian or German confederation,
and concludes that international conflicts are decided in accordance with the
nature of the subject of conflicts in general.
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issue, but decided adversely to the drawing of a distinction. In
France, the acquisition of colonies in North Africa and especially
the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine created an interest in the
problem since conflicts arose between French law and the law of
Alsace and the laws of the tribes in Algeria. Arminjon,"6 Bar-
tin,57 Niboyet5" and Eliescol9 attempted to draw some distinction
between the two sorts of conflicts. The exact points of difference
remain rather vague. As Arminjon says :6o
"The works which do not pass over these difficulties in silence
limit themselves, some to denying the existence of any differences,
others to observing that they [interprovincial conflicts] are less
numerous and less difficult to resolve because of the existence of
the sovereign authority and of common institutions to which the
inhabitants of the divided territories are submitted."
However, it has been suggested that interstate conflicts will
be less frequent than international conflicts because of the fre-
quency with which the rules of law of the particular states will
correspond. This point is illustrated by the movement for uni-
form state laws in the United States. 1 Again, it is said that in
an interstate transaction the forum will be more inclined to give
effect to the law of another state than it would to the law of a
55International Civil and Commercial Law 46-50. Meili points out
that in interprovincial conflicts nationality has a limited application, and that
the existence of a central government will have some influence in producing
cooperation among the constituent states. He discusses the Swiss situation.
5
"Arminjon, Precis de Droit International Privi 115 ff.
57Bartin, Principes de Droit International Priv6 selon la loi et la juris-
prudence Francaise 13-28. He discusses the Alsace and the Algerian situ-
ations.
5SNiboyet, Manuel de Droit International Priv6 15-21.
59Supra note 11. He considers especially the conflicts of annexation.
However, as an introduction to his particular subject, he surveys the field
of interprovincial conflicts in general. He outlines the attitudes earlier
writers have taken on the subject, and considers how the situation has been
worked out in Poland, Switzerland, Alsace, and Algeria. He strongly
believes that solutions of interprovincial, and mother-country-colonial con-
flicts should not be applied in toto to problems of international conflicts. As
to specific points of difference between the international and the interstate
situation, he thinks that in the latter, judgments will be more completely
recognized, domicile will be more generally used than nationality, the law
of the other state will be better known by the judge, rights vested will be
more readily recognized, and there will be no room for discrimination in
favor of the citizens of the forum province in preference to citizens of
another province.
6OArminjon, Precis de Droit International Priv6 115.
6iPillet, Principles de Droit International Privi 45 ff. indicated that he
thought that in a confederated state there was a tendency towards uniform-
ity. On the American uniform law movement, see Kuhn, La Conception du
Drolt Int. Priv6 d'apras la doctrine et la pratique aux Atats-Unis 12.
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foreign country in an international transaction. 2 This result is
supposed to follow from the sentimental ties that bind together
a confederated nation. It seems easier to state the reasons for
believing that this result would follow than to give specific in-
stances where it has happened. Several writers have queried the
applicability to interstate conflicts 63 of the "public order" doctrine
which resembles the Anglo-American public policy. Eliesco,
whose treatment of the problem is the most complete, sharply
distinguishes between (1) conflicts such as those between the
states of the United States, and (2) those between France and
Alsace, and a mother country and a colony, situations in which
there is a constitutional power in a central legislature to prescribe
the conflicts rule, or to require uniformity of law. To Eliesco,0 '
the public order concept is applicable in interprovincial conflicts
only to the former situation which he labels "conflicts of laws
with conflicts of sovereignty."65  It should be kept in mind that
most of the discussion in continental literature deals with inter-
provincial conflicts in which the states are not related to the
central government in the same way the states of the United
States are to the federal government. Stress is always being put
on the power of the central government to smooth over difficulties.
Thus, it can be seen that it is in an exceptional case that the
crossing of an international boundary line has given rise to dis-
62See Meili, International Civil and Commercial Law; Niboyet, Manuel
de Droit International Priv6.
63Waechter, Pillet, supra note 16. Eliesco, Essal sur les Conflits de Lois
dans l'espace sans Conflits de souvertainet6.
64Niboyet similarly sought to separate conflicts into those which were
and those which were not between "sovereignties." He said, Manuel do
Droit International Priv6 16, "Un dtat poss~de ]a forme f~drale comme
les Etats-Unis de sorte que chaque Etat membre de l'6tat f~dral conserve
sa propre legislation avec un autonomic presque complete. On est en
pr6sence d'un conflit interprovincial entre les lois des Etats particuliers
qui ressemble de bien pros A un conflit international."
65As a producer of confusion in legal thinking, the term "sovereignty"
is only to be ranked with "natural justice" and "jurisdiction." Whatever its
feudal origins, the term has long been a part of conflict of laws learning.
The story of the influence of the "sovereignty" concept is a fascinating
chapter in legal history which is yet to be told. All that need be said here
is that the "sovereignty" of conflicts of law is a product of problems of
interstate relations of the Middle Ages, and that it is difficult to distinguish
its meaning from the ideas connected with the concept "territoriality." Its
importance in public international law is a later development. Thus, the
use of the word hinders rather than helps any solution of the problem of
whether a distinction should be drawn between interstate and international
transactions in conflict of laws.
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tinctive treatment in conflict of laws. 0  This result seems a for-
tunate one if it is deemed desirable that the courts emancipate
themselves in conflict problems from the yoke of conceptualism
and adopt the method suggested by Lorenzen" of determining a
particular conflict rule in terms of the effect on the individual and
social interests of the adoption of the rule in question. In this
process, the consideration of the international element might well
be a factor. The external manifestations of nationalism, tariff
barriers, immigration difficulties, as well as the emotional effect
on the individual of the philosophy of nationalism are as much
a part of our environment as the increasing flow of international
trade. Perhaps, for instance, in considering the chattel mort-
gage and conditional sales problems, the courts are balancing the
interest of the mortgagees and the innocent purchaser in the light
of the freedom of commerce to be found within the United States.
If only foreign countries were involved, the mortgagees might
need less protection. On the other hand, if the foreign country
be a neighbor, Canada or Mexico, the risk of loss to the mort-
gagee by a removal out of the state is only slightly less than the
risk of removal to a sister state. In the great majority of situa-
tions, it does not seem that there will be justification for introduc-
ing the complexity of reaching a different result in an interna-
tional transaction than that arrived at in the interstate situation.
As a rule, the effects of the international organization of society
do not appear to have any considerable influence in determining
the expediency of adopting a particular conflict rule. But, the
possibility of proving the importance of the international element
in a particular case should be kept in mind.
The interstate-international distinction seems to have some
utility as an opening wedge to be used in arriving at results to
be eventually applied in both international and interstate transac-
66The question arises whether the penal law doctrine is as applicable
among confederated states as it is among nations. Bartolus, Beale Trans-
lation, page 48, suggests that among confederated cities, a delinquent in
one may be punished in another. Eliesco mentions a provision of Czecko-
Slovakian law by which a criminal prosecution may be brought in another
province than that in which the offense occurred. Essai sur les Conflits
de Lois dans l'6space sans Conflits de souvertainet6 100. The forum is to
apply the law of the place where the act occurred. There is a central leg-
islative body in Czecko-Slovakia with much fuller powers to legislate in
regard to provincial matters than the United States Congress has in regard
to state matters.
67Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflict of Laws,
(1924) 33 Yale L. J. 736.
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tions. If it be thought desirable to restrict the applicability of the
public policy doctrine or to limit to some extent the power of the
situs over anything remotely connected with land, there is indica-
tion that it might be easier to bring about the modification in the
interstate situation. Once the change is brought about there, the
American cases show that the altered rule would have an excel-
lent chance of being applied without comment to the international
transaction.
However, the most interesting aspect of the whole problem is
that, if the subject be considered historically, the result reached
has not been as Judge Thompson saw it, a matter of treating a
sister state with no more confidence than that shown a foreign
country. It is more accurate to say that in a world of nationalism
and tariff barriers, there is afforded the inspiring spectacle of
foreign countries being granted all the privileges of sister states
in a branch of law that has grown up with the relations of confed-
erated states in view.
